W它于12月14日投票，允许南卡罗来纳州电气和天然气与Dominion Energy合并，南卡罗来纳州公共服务委员会试图将现已被废弃的V.C.南卡罗来纳州詹金斯维尔的夏季核电站扩张。同时，专员裁定，SCE＆G在2015年没有欺骗监管机构关于完成该项目的真实成本的监管机构，这是由州公用事业监管机构（监管工作人员办公室）的指控。18luck.cub几天前，SCE＆G已与该州达成和解，该州在该州必须返回纳税人20亿美元，从而在建筑项目中浪费了20亿美元。

该委员会公开会议的戏剧性高点来自SCE＆G前核财务管理局副总裁Carlette L. Walker。一名会计师在委员会代表雇主之前几次作证，她回到了哥伦比亚的州首府，但这次是委员会为期数周的欺骗申诉的明星证人。这不是温暖的聚会或快乐的故事。

Beyond the ratepayers lawsuit, the hearing testimony opened a new window onto one of the more spectacularly wasteful construction projects in recent years and the corporate groupthink or self-interest that may have prolonged it. For the first time, Walker revealed the dissent outside the executive suite around the contracting consortium’s pledges to complete the project. She swore under oath that she signed off on testimony about the estimated costs that was not true. She portrayed her former mentors and colleagues of 30 years as ethically challenged managers who sought to justify future bonuses while ratepayers coughed up higher payments for years of mismanaged construction while, from 2013 to 2017, the overall cost to finish the Summer plant rose to over $13 billion from $9.8 billion.

Walker laced her deposition prior to testifying with bitterness and sarcasm, especially for Kevin Marsh, SCE&G’s CEO—who, along with COO Stephen Byrne—was ousted by the company board in late 2017. She described Marsh as a “worthless liar, because he was only seeking a way to silence me.” Walker said Marsh led four other senior executives in a conspiracy to force her out.

What Walker claimed may be of interest to state and federal investigators and plaintiffs in civil lawsuits accusing SCE&G directors of falling down on the job. The issues come down to what the utility executives knew of the project’s true status, whether they reported accurately to the commission and stockholders and whether the utility was too generous with contractors at the expense of ratepayers and investors.

The project—plus another in Georgia, Plant Vogtle, which is also using Westinghouse’s new AP1000 nuclear reactors—was supposed to have created the first new U.S. nuclear reactors in 30 years. Trouble engulfed the work before construction in Jenkinsville started in 2013, with Westinghouse Electric Co. never finishing design and Shaw Group’s Lake Charles, La., modular plant unprepared for the task.

随着计划的破坏，肖将关键模块运送到南卡罗来纳州，只有部分建造。SCE＆G向Westinghouse投诉了有关设计组件的“不可建造”，并且对合同财团的成本和日程安排有无数的恳求，这些财产和时间表符合空虚的承诺，做得更好。到2015年，Westinghouse允许芝加哥桥和铁购买肖集团的合同，但该财团仍然不可靠。SCE＆G及其项目共同所有人公用事业Santee Cooper试图将大部分成本加合同转换为完全固定价格的合同。Westinghouse计划购买由CB＆I持有的合同，该合同是流血现金并安装了Fluor Corp.，但没有冒险。

Under the new arrangement, SCE&G would pay Westinghouse $100 million to $130 million a month from January to May 2016, with adjustments to be made later in a “true-up.” Kenneth Browne, an SCE&G project nuclear engineer, testified that “to the best of my knowledge” the true-up based on the actual, lower costs expended by the contractor never was done. As the plan for the fixed-price contract approached and SCE&G applied for another rate increase to pay for it, Walker had a small team spend several weeks researching Westinghouse’s latest cost-to-complete estimates. Based on what she learned, she didn’t believe the estimated fixed-price cost to complete of $698 million; she believed $1.2 billion was nearer the truth.

支持薪酬成本的性能因素lete was another puzzle to Walker, she said. That figure—based on how much time contractors took to complete a task versus the original time estimate—was used to determine progress and predict future patterns. A rate of 1.0 would reflect a perfect performance against the estimate, while a higher number would reflect negative performance.

In 2015, the consortium promised to get its performance factor to 1.15, but Walker’s study team determined that this was not achievable because the historical performance factor had been 1.4. In that case, she believed “you’ve got a major problem,” as she said in her deposition. Browne said the study team received no communication about it from senior management and the contractors’ project performance worsened in later months.

As supervisors barraged her with criticism for her doubts in the middle to late months of 2015, her husband suddenly suffered a serious kidney disorder, forcing her to stay home to attend to his care. While she was out, other SCE&G staff drafted Walker’s written testimony to be delivered in the fall endorsing the $698-million completion estimate. Anxious to retain the executives’ support, her high-paying job and health insurance, Walker said she signed off on what essentially was a lie. When she returned to her regular duties on the project, the pressure of her doubts about the project’s costs troubled her so much that Walker’s weight dropped by 70 lb, she testified. At some point in late 2015 or early 2016, Walker said in her deposition, she told current CEO Jimmy Addison, then chief financial officer and Walker’s supervisor, “that I was not going to lie for the company.” As a certified public accountant, she said she felt an obligation to the public. Six weeks later in 2016, she said, the utility company put her on a special medical leave.

Walker didn’t remain completely passive, however. In a phone message left in early 2016 to Marion Cherry of Santee Cooper, Walker declared that her lawyer said the company executives broke numerous laws and that Santee Cooper should drop out. “Don’t sign any change orders,” she advised. Santee Cooper’s withdrawal, together with Westinghouse’s March 2017 bankruptcy, finally forced SCE&G to stop work.

Addison told the commissioners that he never coerced Walker to sign off on false testimony. Former COO Byrne, who also testified in person, and Marsh, who provided a deposition, claimed the company made reasonable estimates in a difficult situation where prime contractor Westinghouse, Shaw Group and CB&I never shaped up. Even so, Byrne testified, but for the Westinghouse bankruptcy, “We would still be building.”

Credibility Questioned

在最近的听证会,SCE&G亚特兰大出局ide attorney, David Balser, sought to undermine Walker’s credibility. He displayed emails sent by Walker to suggest that she did participate in the preparation of her submitted testimony and the company’s $698-million estimate. In the emails, Walker apologizes to Addison and others for her over-the-top, self-righteous behaviors. In sometimes testy responses to Balser, Walker called the offered apologies “creative writing” intended to protect her job.

“I felt very threatened,” she had said in her deposition about the prospect of being fired. Walker eventually retained a lawyer to negotiate a severance package. Her testimony showed not only how the mismanaged project undermined public trust but also how it harmed long-term relationships, careers and her health—and cut short the U.S. nuclear renaissance.

This story was updated Dec. 19 to reflect Kenneth Browne's correct first name and that Carlette Walker's 2015 written testimony was prepared by others while she was out caring for her husband. It was updated Dec. 20 again to show that Walker testified in her deposition that she wasn't put on special medical leave until 2016.