w美国劳工部试图对犯罪行为施加惩罚,据信与今年早些时候在北卡罗来纳州的焊工何塞·阿曼多·马奎达·梅吉亚(Jose Armando Maqueda Mejia)死亡有关,罚款的最大部分为13,653美元,是严重侵犯的最高罚款。它使对雇主PCL民用建设者的拟议罚款达到23,000美元。

但是,如果美国参议院以目前的形式批准了众议院批准的更好的建造法案,那么未来严重的安全违规行为可能会造成高达70,000美元的货币罚款,这是当前限制的五倍,并且未来后更高通货膨胀的调整。这也比焊工的致命事故所寻求的全部罚款还要多,这是当42岁的拆除Bonner桥和跨越部分倒塌时发生的横梁。

construction accident

像2017年的纽约土壤潮和隔离墙崩溃一样,经常提出大罚款。
Photo: OSHA Review Commission Document

更高的安全处罚将为拜登政府提供预期反对工作场所安全和违反劳动法的预期运动的有力工具。自2013年以来,美国平均职业安全和健康管理局的罚款稳步上升至2,300美元,部分受到通货膨胀的年度调整,但有些人认为某些违法行为的罚款长期以来逾期逾期,而对承包商的拥护者感到担忧。

Supporters of higher penalties say the increases would help incentivize employers to work safely by better aligning the financial penalty with what’s called the value of a statistical life (VSL), or what society is willing to pay to save a single life. Federal agencies have generally placed that at around $10 million. In addition to resetting the serious violation fine cap at 10 times its current $7,000 level—with the inflation adjusted amount at $13,653—Build Back Better would reset other fines.

有了更高的罚款上限,OSHA可以“制定更大的后果执法”。
- W. Kip Viscusi和Robert J. Cramer,范德比尔特大学法学院

For willful violations, where the cap of $70,000 has been inflation adjusted to $136,653, the new limit would be reset at $700,000. The proposed changes also add a floor of $50,000 under any willful or repeated violation.

有人说,目前的罚款上限涉及导致死亡的违规行为。范德比尔特大学法学院教授W. Kip Viscusi和研究生Robert J. Cramer说,OSHA自己对法规总成本的分析是“不匹配”的“不匹配”。在草稿中released in October.

However, only a limited number of penalties will reach any newly established higher caps—there is great variety in OSHA’s proposed penalty amounts each year for various violations. Raising some caps will allow “OSHA officials to formulate more consequential enforcement,” Viscusi and Cramer write.

Since OSHA is a small agency that performs a limited number of inspections, “the threat of larger economic penalties for non-compliance may compel more employers to implement safety and health programs that address hazards,” says Chris Trahan Cain, executive director of CPWR—The Center for Construction Research and Training.

在Build Back Better Better Bill的当前版本中,对所有行业的更高安全和违反工资罚款都被指望为联邦财政部增加30亿美元。作为最危险的就业部门之一,建筑最新的拟议OSHA罚款在2019年总计1.394亿美元,并根据通货膨胀进行了调整。

民主党人统一寻求更严格的安全执法。

众议院教育和劳工委员会主席鲍比·斯科特(Bobby Scott)(D-VA。)说,改变建筑物的恢复行为更好,表示需要更新以作为适当的威慑力量。拜登(Biden)最近确认在美国劳工部的OSHA助理秘书道格拉斯·帕克(Douglas Parker)在加利福尼亚州健康与安全机构卡洛萨(Calosha)负责人时以对安全违规者的积极行动而闻名。特朗普政府从未填补这一职位。

相关的建筑商和承包商表示,可能增加的罚款令人震惊。

ABC立法和政治事务副总裁Kristen Swearingen在一份声明中说:“这些有害的罚款将造成大型企业的潜在疫苗任务,“这些有害的处罚将摧毁任何规模的业务。”“向面临重大经济逆风的雇主和雇员的OSHA罚款增加十倍,这是一个挥之不去的大流行,混乱中的供应链和严重的劳动力短缺将促使工人的不确定性并损害我们的经济康复。”


哪些更大的罚款可能无法解决

Labor Dept. records show that PCL Civil Constructors and OSHA have reached an informal settlement of the Bonner Bridge penalties, but the agency does not often issue the heftiest fines over a specific accident to large contractors. A review of OSHA’s recent construction penalties shows that more often, the agency has leveled its six-figure fines at a specialty contractor or multi-unit homebuilder that it accuses of an egregious violation.

“向雇主和雇员的OSHA罚款增加十倍可能会破坏经济复苏。
- 关联的建筑商和承包商

One example is the $280,000 penalty against New Jersey residential contractor Onekey LLC over倒塌的土壤潮和砌块墙OSHA Records说,该公司杀死了纽约州Poughkeepsie的一名工人。

另一个常见的引用是针对反复违规者,奥萨说,先前引用后未能减轻危害。该机构引用了总部位于新泽西州Lodi的Janiec Roofing,并因涉嫌重复违反秋季保护规则而受到新的罚款,总计60万美元。记录显示,该公司无法达成,正在争夺引文的一部分。

雇主对正义的担忧是否应该比对政府执法的预期厌恶更为厌恶?

代表雇主的律师事务所Ogletree Deakins的律师Phillip B. Russell说,随着时间的推移,逐渐增加处罚是最好的。他说,这么快地提高处罚“将对中小型企业绝对毁灭性。”“它将剥夺公司花钱并进行[安全]更改的能力。”其他雇主律师说,OSHA对即使是努力遵循最佳做法或雇员违反导致事故的安全规则的公司也处罚。

The tricky part is in striking a balance between punishing fines and rewards for diligent safety practices. “Organizations may invest their money and time in ensuring regulatory compliance, but perhaps at the expense of doing more specific continual improvement activities that could reduce safety risk even more, says Jan Wachter, a professor of safety science at Indiana University of Pennsylvania.

According to Wachter, “Positively incentivizing optimal organizational safety behavior—rather than being punished for non-optimal safety behavior—is probably better to use in the long run.” The result, he adds, could be that “poor performing companies may become safer, but higher penalties won’t necessarily engender good companies to perform even better.”